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Abstract 
Risk matrices are widely used in risk management. They are a regular feature in various risk management 
standards and guidelines and are also used as formal corporate risk acceptance criteria. It is only recently, 
however, that scientific publications have appeared that discuss the weaknesses of the risk matrix. The 
objective of this paper is to explore these weaknesses, and provide recommendations for the use and 
design of risk matrices. The paper reviews the few relevant publications and adds some observations of its 
own in order to emphasize existing recommendations and add some suggestions. The recommendations 
cover a range of issues, among them: the relation between coloring the risk matrix and the definition of risk 
and major hazard aversion; the qualitative, subjective assessment of likelihood and consequence; the 
scaling of the discrete likelihood and consequence categories; and the use of corporate risk matrix 
standards. Finally, it proposes a probability consequence diagram with continuous scales; providing, in 
some instances, an alternative to the risk matrix. 
Key words: risk matrix, risk analysis, risk assessment, risk management  
1 Introduction 
Risk matrices are simple tools to rank and prioritize risk of (generally adverse) events and to make decisions 
whether certain risks can be tolerated. A risk matrix displays the basic properties, “consequence” and 
“likelihood”, of an adverse event and the aggregate notion of risk by means of a graph. It uses discrete 
categories of consequence, likelihood, and risk. Using categories rather than numerical values has appeal to 
both risk specialists and laymen as a means of stressing the uncertainties in risk statements. The 
combinations of consequence and likelihood are mapped on to a limited number of risk categories (often 
visualized by different colors) and this mapping may include subjective considerations, such as major 
hazard aversion. 
Risk matrices present risk graphically, and belong to the set of probability consequence diagrams as 
described by (Ale, Burnap et al., 2015). 
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Risk matrices are referred to in the informative sections of various international standards such as ISO 
17776 (2002), IEC 60812 (2006), and ISO 31010 (2010) and industry sector or national risk management 
practices, for example (DNV, 2009, Carter, Hirst et al., 2003, PPRT, 2005). 
A paper from BASF (Ruge, 2004) documents how a single risk matrix gains the status of a corporate 
framework, governing risk management decisions throughout an entire company. Although ISO 31010, in 
its Appendix B29 (2010), advises that risk matrices should be adapted to each area of application, we have 
observed that several large companies have developed corporate risk matrices to standardize risk decisions 
throughout their organization. 
The aim of any risk evaluation tool is to ensure that the decision process is transparent, based on best 
knowledge and reflects the common understanding of stakeholders. When reviewing the application of risk 
matrices, it becomes obvious that this simple tool has some notable weaknesses. Both users and designers 
of risk matrices should be aware of these shortcomings and ensure that the risk matrices are used in such a 
way that correct conclusions are drawn. Only recently have some publications addressed this problem. The 
first openly critical review was published by Cox (2008) followed by Levine (2012) and Flage and Røed 
(2012). The mentioned appendix B29 of ISO 31010 (2010) also includes an invaluable summary of the 
advantages and disadvantages of risk matrices, together with recommendations for their usage.   
Risk matrices have two main applications. The application or aim of the risk matrix is relevant when 
discussing the suitability of risk matrices. One application is decision-making about the acceptance of risk; 
the other is to prioritize which risk needs to be addressed first.  
Frequently, in risk acceptance, only three levels of risk are distinguished: hazards or events with 
unacceptable risk (often indicated with a red color); hazards or events in which the risk is found to be 
“broadly acceptable”, i.e. not requiring further risk reduction (often indicated with green), and an 
intermediate level, where risk should be reduced “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP, often 
indicated with yellow). Given these interpretations, there is no need to further prioritize hazards, at least 
not in the red and green areas. 
In cases where the risk matrix is used for prioritizing (which hazards require most attention in order to 
reduce the cumulative risk), a larger number of risk levels may be necessary in order to obtain sufficient 
resolution to rank events or hazards in order of priority. Even then, different hazards may end up either in 
the same cell or with the same assigned risk (so called risk ties, see (Ni, Chen et al., 2010).  
At the end of this paper (Section 6) we describe a probability consequence diagram with continuous scales 
for likelihood and consequence as an alternative to the risk matrix with discrete categories.  Such a 
representation can solve some disadvantages of discrete risk matrices (such as risk ties). 
2 Definition of the risk matrix 
Risk matrices have been described in many occasions, so this section is limited to a short, formal 
description in order to support the subsequent analysis. 
Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event together with the 
associated likelihood of its occurrence (Note 4 to the definition of risk in ISO 31000 (2009)). Statements 
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about risk are statements about possible future situations, and these statements are, by their nature, 
inherently uncertain. In order to manage this uncertainty in an intuitive way, many risk managers prefer 
not to assign numerical values to likelihood and consequence, but instead assign discrete categories of 
consequence and likelihood to the event. As discussed later in this paper (Section 6), this is not necessarily 
the correct way of dealing with uncertainty. The risk matrix facilitates assigning a discrete risk category to 
each combination of consequence and likelihood, i.e. it provides a mapping of consequence and likelihood 
to risk. This mapping may be subjective and is not bound by formal restrictions, though it is natural to 
ensure that the mapping function is monotonically increasing: an increase in consequence (where 
likelihood remains the same) or an increase in likelihood (where consequence remains the same) may not 
lead to a decrease of the assigned risk. The mapping may account for subjective or societal aspects of risk 
perception, such as major hazard aversion (events with low likelihood yet large consequences are assigned 
a higher risk than events with small consequences and high likelihood even if the expected loss – expected 
loss being defined as consequence × likelihood - is the same).  
Each pair of consequence category and likelihood category can be assigned a different risk attribute, if 
there are ‘N’ consequence categories and ‘M’ likelihood categories, one can discriminate N×M different, 
discrete risk categories, see Figure 1. Nevertheless, it is normal to divide the grid of the risk matrix in areas 
with fewer categories, often by using colors, such as green, yellow and red, to represent low, medium and 
high risk, or by deriving a risk score, often an ordinal value, through the combination of consequence and 
likelihood. This means that different combinations of consequence and likelihood are assigned identical 
risk: they have the same color or the same risk score. In the remainder of the paper, “coloring”, in the sense 
of assigning a color to a cell in the matrix, and risk scoring, in the sense of assigning a risk score to a cell, 
will, in most instances, be considered as synonyms. 
 
  Consequence Categories 
  C1 C2 C3 C4 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
Ca
te
go
rie
s F3 R6 R9 R11 R12 
F2 R3 R5 R8 R10 
F1 R1 R2 R4 R7 
Figure 1. A 3x4 risk matrix leads in principle to 12 distinguishable risk categories 
 
Risk matrices can be used in two stages: in the first, the potential event (or hazard) is plotted in the two-
dimensional grid of the risk matrix according to assigned consequence and likelihood. In this process, even 
when the grid is divided in a limited number of colors, no information is lost as yet: the viewer can still see 
how the position of the hazard originates from its consequence and likelihood attributes, see Figure 2. In 
the second stage however, the risk (color or score) of the event or hazard is portrayed as a single 
dimension, and it is here that the mapping of risk really becomes effective and is most significant in 
influencing decision-making regarding tolerability, or setting priorities.  
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 Consequence Categories 
 
  C1: Insignificant Consequences 
C2: Significant 
Consequences 
C3: Serious 
Accident 
C4: Major 
Accident 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
Ca
te
go
rie
s 
F4: 
Frequent         
F3: 
Probable 
No personal 
harm 
Recoverable 
Injuries     
F2: 
Improbable     
Single Fatality 
and several 
Injured 
Several 
Fatalities and 
many Injured 
F1: Very 
Improbable         
Figure 2. Example of a risk matrix with alternative outcomes for an imaginary unintended event. The three shades of gray, from 
dark to light represent red, green and yellow, respectively.  
 
2.1 Defining risk in the framework of the risk matrix 
In the above, risk is defined as the mapping of the two attributes of an adverse event (consequence, 
likelihood) to some value of risk. In the context of the risk matrix the value of risk is a discrete value, 
corresponding to the categories of consequence and likelihood: “IF frequency is “f”’ category AND severity 
of consequences is “c” category THEN risk is “r” category” (Markowski and Mannan, 2008). 
It should be noted that in earlier publications, notably Cox (2008), and Levine (2012), risk is separately 
defined as Risk=probability × consequence or a similar function. The essence of Cox’ analysis is that the risk 
matrix should show “logical compatibility with quantitative risks”. From this approach, the above 
multiplicative function is the underlying, governing principle, and the presentation in the risk matrix shall 
replicate that definition of risk, and equal risk scores in the matrix shall correspond to equal values of the 
product of the cell’s ordinates. It is obvious that any subjective risk mapping that deviates from such a 
multiplicative function violates this compatibility.  
We advocate that the risk mapping that appears through the scoring or coloring of the risk matrix is a risk 
definition in its own right, as it may express subjective risk perceptions, i.e. major hazard aversion, that are 
considered important for risk decisions. However, the concept of expected loss (probability or frequency × 
consequence) will be used to demonstrate that choices made in the design of the risk matrix may have an 
unanticipated influence on, for example, the level of major hazard aversion expressed by the risk matrix. 
3 Category scales in the risk matrix 
The discrete consequence and likelihood categories can be respectively identified by nominal, textual 
descriptions, such as “negligible”, “serious”, “catastrophic”, and “almost impossible”, “probable”, “often”, 
as in Figure 2. It is logical that the categories should be placed in order along the sides (ordinates) of the 
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risk matrix, i.e. consequence categories should be ranked from least to most severe, and likelihood 
categories should be ranked from lowest to highest. Such ranking is necessary if the monotonous character 
of the risk mapping (risk increases if consequence and/or likelihood increases) should be intuitively visible 
from the matrix. 
From this arises one criterion for the choice of categories, viz. that they actually can be ranked. This has two 
implications: 
a)  The meaning and ordering of the nominal categories should be instantly clear to the viewer. This is 
not a trivial issue (see also (Hubbard and Evans, 2010)). Consider, for example, the ranking of 
descriptors that may be suggested as synonyms in dictionaries, but which are often used in risk 
matrices to demarcate different categories: 
• often, frequent, probable; 
• improbable, seldom; 
• disastrous, catastrophic.  
b) In relation to consequences, it means that different types of impact which cannot be directly 
compared, such as the impact on the environment, human life, or the economy, cannot be used 
together as separate categories within a single risk matrix. Either each type of impact requires its 
own separate risk matrix, or a set of categories is defined at a higher level that embraces the 
different impacts. The last method implies an explicit comparison of the severity of different 
impacts on the same high-level scale (e.g. “a single injury” and “destroying one hectare of 
preserved nature” are both in the high level category “very serious”). This issue is explored by Flage 
and Røed  (2012) under the topic of aggregating risk from several consequence dimensions.  
Therefore they suggest using separate risk matrices instead. However, when using separate risk 
matrices, severity is still compared, albeit implicitly, across types of impact through the chosen risk 
mapping for each matrix. 
Because of the difficulty as described under a) above, it is advisable that the nominal categories can be 
linked to some (more or less objectively) quantifiable reference. One example for such a reference can be 
to link likelihood to the stakeholders’ perceptions, such as (see e.g. (Ruge, 2004)):  
• “has happened within own organizational unit”,  
• “has happened in this branch of industry”,  
• “has happened in the world”. 
Instead, or complementary to, using nominal categories, numerical ranges can be used to clarify the 
categories, e.g. costs intervals, delay times, or number of injuries for the consequence categories;  and 
probability or expected frequency for the likelihood categories. ISO (2010) recommends to add this 
information if available. 
3.1 Linear or logarithmic scales 
When reviewing the literature regarding risk matrices, as well as examples of risk matrices encountered in 
practice, it soon becomes apparent that there are different approaches towards the (approximate) 
quantitative scaling of the categories. The examples discussed by Cox (2008) show categories where the 
bounds between all categories, both for likelihood and consequence, are equidistant (0-0.2; 0.2-0.4; etc.). 
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Very close to this are “bell-shaped” or other arbitrary category definitions, that offer higher resolution for 
probabilities close to 0 and close to 1 (e.g. 0.00–0.10; 0.10–0.40; 0.40–0.60; 0.60–0.90; 0.90–1.00, (Ni, Chen 
et al., 2010)), but where all widths of the categories are within one order of magnitude. These scales are 
most popular for project risk assessments and similar exercises, where likelihood can be measured in 
percentage. We will call this scaling or spacing “basically linear” in order to stress that the scaling is not 
necessarily strictly linear, due to either variation in quantitative limits of category classes, or the 
imprecision introduced by nominal categories.  
However, risk matrices may use categories where each category differs by an order of magnitude from the 
previous one, i.e. the ratio between the bounds (or the quantitative equivalents of those) of subsequent 
categories are constant. This approach is favored by safety-related studies, where likelihood is expressed as 
expected frequency (number of expected occurrences per unit time), and these frequencies may vary by 
many orders of magnitude. Thus, likelihood is represented on a logarithmic scale. 
Consequence categories can also be expressed on scales of a logarithmic nature, although this may not be 
apparent when using verbal descriptions. In many safety-related risk matrices different “metrics” are used 
in subsequent categories in such a manner that it obscures the nature of the scaling, for instance: minor 
injuries, loss-time injuries, severe injuries, and fatalities. Comparing the severity of such metrics (e.g. minor 
injuries with severe injuries) is mainly subjective. However, there are some indications that moving from 
minor to major injuries, and to fatalities, can be considered a logarithmic increase in severity. The European 
Railway Agency has introduced the concept of ‘fatalities and weighted serious injuries (FWSI)’, “whereby 1 
serious injury is considered statistically equivalent to 0.1 fatality” (European Railway Agency, 2008). 
Furthermore, such logarithmic relationships may be inferred from empirically observed frequencies of 
occurrence of different consequences:  According to (Prem, Ng et al., 2010) the observed frequency of 
occurrence of: minor injury; major injury; fatality; 10 fatalities; 100 fatalities, varies approximately by a 
factor of 10 from one category to the next. Such scaling will therefore be referenced as “basically 
logarithmic”. 
The choice of (basically) linear or logarithmic scales has implications upon how the matrix’ coloring relates 
to quantitative expressions of risk, especially expected loss. This will be further explored in sections 4.3 and 
5.2. 
4 Review of earlier comments on risk matrices 
A review of earlier discussions on risk matrices highlights concerns with the following issues: 
• Consistency between the risk matrix and quantitative measures, and, as a consequence, the 
appropriateness of decisions based on risk matrices (Cox, 2008, Levine, 2012, Flage and Røed, 2012); 
• The subjective classification of consequence and probability  (Cox, 2008, Smith, Siefert et al., 2009, ISO, 
2010, Hubbard and Evans, 2010); 
• The definition of risk scores and its relation to the scaling of the categories (linear or logarithmic) 
(Levine, 2012, Ni, Chen et al., 2010, Ruge, 2004, Franks, (not dated), Franks and Maddison, 2006, 
Hubbard and Evans, 2010); 
• The limited resolution of risk matrices - resulting in “risk ties” (Cox, 2008, Ni, Chen et al., 2010); 
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• The aggregation of scenarios, consequences and risk in risk matrices (Flage and Røed, 2012, Franks, 
(not dated), Franks and Maddison, 2006, PPRT, 2005, Cahen, 2006, ISO, 2010)  
• Problems related to the use of universal or corporate-wide risk matrices (Flage and Røed, 2012, ISO, 
2010) 
4.1 Consistency between risk matrices and quantitative risk measures 
One of the first critical assessments of risk matrices was published by Cox (2008), who states that a well-
defined risk matrix (including its coloring) shall fulfil three axioms: Weak Consistency; Betweenness; and 
Consistent Coloring. These axioms can be described as follows, see also (Levine, 2012, Flage and Røed, 
2012): 
• Weak Consistency means that each hazard in the red category, by inference, represents a larger risk 
than those in the green category; 
• Betweenness means that every positively sloped line segment that starts in the green category and 
ends in a red category must pass through a yellow risk category; 
• Consistent Coloring means that hazards with (approximately) equal risk shall have the same color. 
As previously stated, Cox requires there to be compatibility between the risk matrix (and its coloring) and a 
separate or independent definition of a quantitative risk measure. In this respect the “color” has to match 
this quantitative risk measure. For quantitative definitions of risk as continuous functions of frequency and 
consequence, it is clearly no trivial matter to create risk matrices consistent with such functions. 
Quantitative iso-risk curves will pass through any cell, dividing the cells in areas with “lower” and “higher” 
risks, and these iso-risk curves will not follow the square cell boundaries. Note that Cox allows risk to vary 
within a cell, rather than considering risk within a single cell to be a single, discrete value.  
When, as proposed in this paper, no reference is made to an external risk definition, but the coloring of the 
matrix itself is the only relevant risk definition, then the axioms for weak consistency and consistent 
coloring are trivial. Instead, one should ensure that risk is a monotonously increasing function of both 
consequence and probability, which can be defined as follows: 
If consequence category A is more severe than consequence category B, and probability category 
M represents a larger probability than probability category N, then the risk of (B,N) shall be smaller 
than or equal to the risk of (A,M) for all possible combinations of A,B,M, and N. 
Indeed, if a continuous quantitative definition of risk is used alongside a discrete risk matrix, it can 
therefore be expected that one arrives at different decisions when using the risk matrix than one would 
when using the continuous quantitative definition. When all stakeholders in a case agree on the continuous 
quantitative risk definition, then the use of that quantitative risk definition is to be preferred: there is no 
benefit in transferring an adequate continuous function to a discrete function with low resolution, even if 
there is uncertainty in the assessment of consequence and probability (see section 6 below). 
Considering the conflicts between the representation in a risk matrix and a separate, independent risk 
definition, then, if a risk matrix be used, “risk” should be unambiguously defined by the coloring of the 
matrix, and no attempt should be made to match that coloring to another measure of risk. It is the 
responsibility of the designer of the risk matrix to ensure that the matrix represents the stakeholders’ 
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perception of risk. The designer should be aware how the risk matrix relates to risk principles such as 
expected loss and major hazard aversion. 
4.2 The subjective classification of consequence and probability 
The application of a risk matrix requires the use of discrete categories or classes for likelihood and 
consequence. This feature has been criticized by some authors, though it should be noted that any risk 
assessment not based on a purely statistical basis and mathematical consequence assessment requires 
subjective assessments to be made. Therefore, the issue is not solely a problem of application of the risk 
matrix. We acknowledge that a priori assessments of likelihood and consequence of adverse events are not 
precise, but rather subjective assessments that, due to the infrequent nature of the events, can seldom be 
verified against observations or statistics. 
ISO (2010) states in regard to the disadvantages of risk matrices that, among other concerns, “it is difficult 
to define scales unambiguously” and “use is very subjective and there tends to be significant variation 
between raters”.  Conversely, (Smith, Siefert et al., 2009) acknowledges that categorization may be 
required, because: “The continuous scale (…) may result in un-resolvable discussion about the location of 
risk points. Risk managers need risk matrices with sufficient, but not excessive, granularity that aids in the 
timely placement of risk points”. Nonetheless, when people have to make subjective assessments and need 
to assign consequence and likelihood categories to certain events, the ways in which the categories are 
defined and described effect these subjective assignments. 
Subjective judgments are subject to a number of cognitive biases: These can be individual and 
unpredictable, or partly predictable, for a group of assessors. Hubbard and Evans (2010) consider that 
individual experiences, optimism bias, and confirmation bias; but also overconfidence and individual 
variability (the same individual making different assessments at different times) affect judgment of 
likelihood and consequence. As mentioned before, variability in the understanding of verbal descriptions 
will also affect subjective assessments (Kent, 1964, Hubbard and Evans, 2010), while people also tend to 
assign quantitative meaning to numbers that are merely ordinal (likelihood in category F1 is half of  
likelihood in category F2) (Hubbard and Evans, 2010). There doesn’t appear to be any simple way of 
overcoming these biases apart from training and feedback to the assessors, which is impractical when the 
assessors are only involved in these kinds of exercises a few times.  
Smith, Siefert et al. (2009) conducted a study on bias and risk matrices, demonstrating centering bias 
(people preferably choose values in the center of the offered scale) as well as asymmetric bias (noticeably 
consequences tend to be estimated toward the high end of the scale, see also section 5.1). It is not clear 
whether the prospect theory used by Smith, Siefert et al. (2009)  to correct for bias can be used on non-
linear scales.  
There are a few methods of avoiding subjective bias. The first is to use quantitative data as frequently as 
possible (thereby reducing the need for subjective judgments). Variability in understanding of verbal 
descriptions can be limited by adding quantitative descriptions (ranges, anchor points) to the definition of 
categories. Centering bias can be counteracted by extending the range of the categories (i.e. adding an 
extra category) to both sides of the expected range of consequence and likelihood. 
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4.3 Risk scores and scaling 
Risk levels can be assigned to cells in the risk matrix in two ways, either by coloring using subjective 
arguments, or by numerical risk scores based on algorithms using ordinal numbers assigned to each 
consequence and probability category. Sometimes one will encounter risk matrices using both methods 
(i.e. numerical risk scores and colors). This may be problematic if there is inconsistency between coloring 
and the numerical risk scores.  If the numerical scores are considered to represent a quantitative risk 
measure, the axioms of consistency as formulated by Cox (2008) shall apply.  
There are different ways of using elementary mathematical operations to derive a numerical risk score 
from the ordinal category numbers (Ni, Chen et al., 2010). Addition and multiplication obey the above 
formulated requirement of monotonous increase; the other operations (subtraction and division) do not 
and will not be discussed here. 
When the risk matrix is expected to present risk in a similar way as expected loss, and the categories are 
basically linearly spaced, then multiplication of the ordinal numbers of the categories (from low to high) is 
an appropriate way of defining a risk score, see Figure 3.  However, when the categories are basically 
logarithmically spaced, addition of the ordinal numbers is the more desirable option, see Figure 4. The link 
between scaling and scoring has been pointed out by Flage and Røed (2012).  
 
  Consequence Categories 
  C1 C2 C3 C4 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
Ca
te
go
rie
s 
F4 R4 R8 R12 R16 
F3 R3 R6 R9 R12 
F2 R2 R4 R6 R8 
F1 R1 R2 R3 R4 
Figure 3. A 4x4 risk matrix with risk scores derived from multiplication of the ordinal numbers of the likelihood and consequence 
category 
  Consequence Categories 
  C1 C2 C3 C4 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
Ca
te
go
rie
s 
F4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
F3 R4 R5 R6 R7 
F2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
F1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
Figure 4. A 4x4 risk matrix with risk scores derived from the addition of the ordinal numbers of the likelihood and consequence 
category Notice the identical risk scores along diagonals. 
Levine (2012) observes that, when using (basically) logarithmic scales, compatibility with a quantitative risk 
definition (such as expected loss) is better in terms of weak consistency and consistent coloring than when 
using (basically) linear scales. Indeed, the oft observed coloring along diagonal bands, as demonstrated in 
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Figure 3 and Figure 4, is in better agreement with the additive than with the multiplicative scores: the 
additive scores present equal risk along the diagonals from the upper left to the lower right cells of the 
matrix (see figure 4). Levine (2012) uses this as an argument to advocate logarithmic scaling. 
It should be mentioned that the concept of risk may include aspects other than likelihood and 
consequence. Flage and Røed (2012) mention manageability, uncertainty and criticality as other aspects of 
risk, which, by dint of the nature of the two-dimensionality of the risk matrix, cannot be expressed by 
coloring or mathematically calculated risk scores. Flage and Røed propose other means of depicting these 
dimensions. 
4.4 Resolution 
As risk matrices make use of discrete categories of consequence and likelihood, the resolution is limited by 
the number of categories. Cox (2008) considers the limited resolution as an inherent disadvantage of risk 
matrices. Indeed compatibility with expected loss and the requirement of consistent coloring are 
problematic as linear scaling leads to large variation of (quantitative) risk within a single cell, especially 
close to the upper left and lower right corners (when categories are aligned as in Figure 2, Figure 3, and 
Figure 4).  
In addition to problems of resolution linked to requiring compatibility with expected loss, limited resolution 
may lead to many combinations of consequence and likelihood leading to the same color or risk score. This 
is addressed by (Ni, Chen et al., 2010) and commonly referred to as risk ties: if the risk matrix is being used 
for prioritizing risks and risk mitigation actions, risk ties prevent risks from being ranked unambiguously. Ni 
et al. propose the use of a methodology based on the Borda count, using the likelihood and consequence 
ranks as independent scores, to provide further ordering. Nonetheless, several combinations may lead to 
equal Borda counts. Note that this Borda methodology, when used as a risk priority ranking, implicitly puts 
equal weight on consequence and likelihood. 
In many cases, it is not necessary to obtain a single ranking of risk. Often it is sufficient to simply identify 
unacceptable risks (“red”), broadly acceptable risks (“green”) and intermediate risks (“yellow”), typically to 
be reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). If the resolution of the categories for likelihood 
and consequence are deemed sufficient and practicable (users are able to select the correct categories for 
the events without major ambiguity), there are no further drawbacks of limited resolution in the outcomes 
(the risk cells). This is not to say that outcomes of the risk matrix are independent of the chosen scale 
resolutions (Hubbard and Evans, 2010).  
However, the designer of the risk matrix should be aware of the consequences of the resolution and scaling 
of the categories. ISO (2010) observes, with respect to resolution: 
• “The consequence scale (or scales) should cover the range of different types of consequence to be 
considered (…) and should extend from the maximum credible consequence to the lowest consequence 
of concern”. 
• “The probability scale needs to span the range relevant to the study in hand, remembering that the 
lowest probability must be acceptable for the highest defined consequence, otherwise all activities with 
the highest consequence are defined as intolerable.” 
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In addition, the designer should pay attention to the implications of using different resolutions for 
likelihood and consequence (e.g. using factors of 10 for (logarithmically spaced) subsequent likelihood 
categories and factors of 3 for consequence) or even of combining linear and logarithmic spacing (e.g. 
logarithmic spacing for likelihood and linear spacing for consequence). These implications will be discussed 
in greater detail in the section on major hazard aversion, 5.2. 
4.5 Aggregation and detail 
Aggregation covers two slightly different issues. In the first instance, aggregation points at the question of 
how to combine the impact of a single event on different areas of concern (e.g. financial, environmental, 
reputation, safety). This issue is addressed by Flage and Røed (2012) as well as by ISO (2010): “It is difficult 
to combine or compare the level of risk for different categories of consequences”. This issue has been 
previously explored in section 3. 
Secondly, aggregation addresses how to combine the risk of multiple hazards that originate from a single 
activity. This type of aggregation is considered more problematic than the problem described in the 
previous paragraph, as it may mean that in the end, the decision based on the risk matrix depends on the 
level of detail of the study, i.e. the number of individual accident events that are assessed. Consider, for 
example, the case of a pipe-line risk assessment. One can identify a single event of a “generic” breach of a 
pipeline somewhere along the whole length, or one may identify several breaches in distinct sections along 
the pipeline. The impact of any such breach may be quite similar in all places, but the likelihood of such an 
occurrence somewhere along the pipeline is higher than the likelihood of a breach at a specific section. So 
the “generic” breach will be assigned a higher risk than the risk occurring in a specific section. How then can 
one compare the first approach with the total risk of the set of breaches from the second approach?  
ISO (ISO, 2010) states regarding the risk matrix:  
1. “Risks cannot be aggregated (i.e. one cannot define that a particular number of low risks or a low risk 
identified a particular number of times is equivalent to a medium risk);” 
2. “Results will depend on the level of detail of the analysis, i.e. the more detailed the analysis, the higher 
the number of scenarios, each with a lower probability. This will underestimate the actual level of risk. 
The way in which scenarios are grouped together in describing risk should be consistent and defined at 
the start of the study.” 
As indicated in section 4.2, one cannot perform calculus on events that are assigned ordinal numbers. 
However, if the characteristics of the ordinal scales are known, i.e. when accounting for the quantitative 
limits of the categories, some valid statements can be made, which have been used to derive rules for 
aggregation in some specific applications. Viz. for basically logarithmically scaled likelihood categories, 
where each category is a factor ‘n’ more probable than the previous category: when n events are classed in 
the same category, then the likelihood of any of those events happening can be assigned to the next 
category. This rule has been used in the French guidelines for industrial major hazard assessments (PPRT, 
2005). Despite this, as a general rule one should avoid the need of aggregation. Consider cases where 
similar events lead to the same consequence, i.e. the consequence can be described with the same terms 
and will be in the same consequence category. In instances such as these similar events should be 
considered as a single event. Detailing events is not in line with using the simple risk matrix methodology. 
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If consequences can be quantified on a single scale, risk can best be expressed by the cumulative 
distribution of the consequences of the individual events, which is independent on the level of detail (Ale, 
Burnap et al., 2015), and a risk matrix would no longer be an adequate tool. 
4.6 Corporate risk matrices 
Several major companies have attempted to standardize risk management across the company, and, as the 
risk matrix is perceived as a useful and widely applied risk assessment tool, this means that a standard risk 
matrix is proposed for use throughout the entire organization. An example is described by Ruge (2004). 
Arguments in favor of corporate standardized risk matrices are the introduction of a unified way of 
performing risk assessment and aligning terminology and risk acceptance criteria across a company. 
However ISO (2010) warns against the use of corporate standardized risk matrices: “A matrix should be 
designed to be appropriate for the circumstances so it may be difficult to have a common system applying 
across a range of circumstances relevant to an organization”. The issue is also addressed by Flage and Røed 
(2012), who observe that what may be tolerable at company level, is not necessary tolerable at department 
level.  
Some issues that complicate the application of risk matrices have been described in the previous sections. 
These sections show that subjective judgments about classification (section 4.2) and study detail (section 
4.5) have a significant influence on the study outcome and that agreement between stakeholders before 
the study is important. Standardizing corporate risk matrices without detailed instruction or training on 
how to deal with those subjective issues in very diverse contexts does not necessarily lead to similar 
outcomes in comparable situations. 
Ruge (2004) describes two examples of the application of a corporate risk matrix. Both examples address 
continuous unit operations of comparable size. However, it has been observed that in several other 
companies a standard corporate risk matrix shall be applied to both continuous operations as well as 
construction and maintenance projects. For example, in a utility company, the same risk matrix shall be 
applied to the operation of a large coal-fired power plant, the erection of a wind turbine, and the 
maintenance of a transformer station. To apply the proper interpretation of likelihood categories (using 
frequency for continuous operations and probability for one-off projects) requires careful consideration in 
each particular case.  Harmonizing the risk management process in these very diverse activities by using a 
standard risk matrix requires a lot of additional guidance that stands at odds with the simplicity of risk 
matrices. 
5 Other issues 
In addition to the issues that have received attention in the existing literature, we want to draw attention 
to a few supplementary issues related to: 
• Different possibilities when considering the consequence of an event; 
• Hazard aversion that is (implicitly) expressed by the assignment of risk levels; 
• Dealing with uncertainty, which will be covered in a separate section, 6. 
13  Accepted for publication in Safety Science 2015-02-22 
Journal reference: SAFETY3016 
Author Preprint 
 
5.1 Ambiguity of the consequence definition 
There are different practices for defining the consequence endpoints .Three possibilities have been 
observed in practice: 
1. The consequence is represented by an event that has the potential to cause damage (worst case); the 
associated probability is the probability that the event (irrespective of the actual damage) occurs (cf. 
the definition of severity categories at BASF, where the term  “potential” is explicitly mentioned (Ruge, 
2004)); 
2. The consequence is represented by the most likely or most representative damage; the associated 
probability is the probability that the event (irrespective of the actual damage) occurs; 
3. The consequence is represented by a number of alternative, discrete damage outcomes, each in 
another consequence category; the associated probabilities are the probabilities that each of those 
damages occur. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that each of those methods may lead to another assessment of risk. The adverse 
event scenario can be depicted using a bowtie-, cause-consequence- or safety-barrier diagram, see the top 
half of Figure 5. The individual damage outcomes are mapped onto the risk matrix (method 3 above) as well 
as the Critical Event (method 1 above), noting that the potential of the critical event must be the worst of 
the three potential outcomes. Now method 1 would lead to the conclusion that the situation is 
unacceptable (the critical event in combination with the worst outcome is in the “red” area). Method 2 is 
ambiguous: the event is probable, but it is not obvious what the representative outcome should be. Is the 
representative outcome in consequence category C1 (No personal harm, 68% probability) or category C3 
(Single Fatality and several Injured, 30% probability)?  If the most probable outcome is selected, the 
conclusion is that the event is broadly acceptable! Method 3 concludes that no outcome is worse than that 
it is in the “yellow” area. (Note that the example is picked to produce the broadly acceptable outcome for 
method 2, normally the difference will be less than in this example) 
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Figure 5 Alternative ways of mapping outcomes onto the risk matrix: The potential of the Critical Event or the individual 
outcomes of the event. The likelihood scale is logarithmically spaced. 
From this we can draw the following conclusions: Method 1 may lead to overly conservative outcomes, but 
this cannot be avoided in cases where no further information about the distribution of outcomes can be 
obtained. Method 3 appears preferable in that it also allows addressing consequence mitigation as control 
options (i.e. changing the distribution of damage outcomes), but may lead to many entries in the matrix 
when several events are considered.   
 Method 2 needs careful consideration of what can be considered the “representative” damage outcome to 
avoid overly optimistic outcomes.  
Although method 1 is not the recommended approach according to ISO (2010), it is often encountered and 
maybe quite well in line with the overall approximate nature of risk matrices, if the approach is used 
consistently (i.e. the approach is used for all events assessed in the risk matrix) and the risk acceptance 
takes account of the fact that actual likelihood of damage will be lower than the likelihood of the critical 
event (with the potential for damage).  
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5.2 Major-hazard aversion 
In sections 2.1 and 4.1 the relationship between expected loss as a definition of risk and risk being defined 
by the coloring of the risk matrix was considered. In this paper we argue that the coloring of the risk matrix 
can be accepted as a definition of risk in its own right. However, the user and designer of a risk matrix and 
its coloring should be aware of how that coloring relates to expected loss, because the coloring and 
category scaling together determine the amount of hazard aversion. Hazard aversion is to be understood as 
the attitude that a low probability-large consequence event is assigned higher risk value than a high 
probability-low consequence event, even when the expected loss for both events is the same (In other 
papers, this is often referred to as risk aversion, see e.g. (Jonkman, Van Gelder et al., 2003), but because 
risk aversion originally includes aversion to uncertainty rather than consequence severity (Bedford, 2013), 
this paper uses the term “(major-) hazard aversion” instead). 
Risk matrices are very suitable for expressing hazard aversion in accordance with the stakeholders’ 
preferences. It is possible to apply hazard aversion only at the high hazard end of the matrix’s consequence 
range and express a more neutral attitude at the low hazard end. However, one should be aware that the 
scaling of the categories also needs to be taken into consideration when expressing hazard aversion. This is 
illustrated by the following case. 
Figure 6 shows a risk matrix inspired by a real case. As can be seen, the likelihood categories are 
logarithmically scaled with a factor 10 increase in likelihood between subsequent categories. The 
consequence categories C3 to C5 also show a basically logarithmic scaling; from additional consequence 
ranking numbers included in the original matrix it could be deduced that the logarithmic scaling extended 
over all consequence categories. Moreover, that the factor of severity increase between consequence 
categories was significantly lower than 10. In Figure 6 this factor is chosen as 5, equal to the increase in the 
number of fatalities between category C4 and C5. 
 
Figure 6  Risk matrix with a coloring and scaling that exhibit major-hazard aversion. The arrow points at the two cells with, 
according to the coloring, approximately equal risk as explained in the text. 
If the factor of severity increase between consequence categories had been the same as the factor of 
likelihood increase between likelihood categories, cells on diagonals from upper left to lower right would 
represent equal expected loss (so cell C1-F5 would have same expected loss as cell C5-F1). If that had been 
the case, a coloring that follows such a diagonal would represent a neutral attitude to hazard (no major-
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hazard aversion). In this case however, the factor of severity increase is lower than the factor of likelihood 
increase, so moving downwards along a diagonal would mean a decrease in expected loss (as the factor for 
the likelihood is twice the factor for the consequence, the expected loss in each cell along a diagonal is a 
factor of 2 lower than the expected loss in the previous cell). So a coloring that follows the diagonal strictly 
would represent already some hazard aversion due to this difference in the scaling of the categories along 
the two axes. Now Figure 7 shows a coloring that is consistent with expected loss, i.e. if expected loss in 
two cells are the same, then the color of the cell (the risk category) is also the same. The coloring for the 
column C3 has been chosen to be the same as in Figure 6. In order to obtain consistency with expected loss, 
the borders of the color regions are slightly “flattened” as compared to the diagonals due to the different 
category factors for both axes (actually, there is one other consistent coloring, in which the cells C1-F4 and 
C5-F1 both are “green”). 
 
Figure 7 Risk matrix with a coloring exhibiting equal risk acceptance for events with equal expected loss 
However, in the original matrix shown in Figure 6 the borders of the color regions are steeper than the 
diagonals (two cells down, then one to the right). This expresses major hazard aversion: while major injury 
(C3) is tolerated with likelihood F5, the next serious consequence, fatality (C4), is only tolerated at F3, i.e. a 
frequency which is a factor 100 lower. Such borders can be interpreted as expressing: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∝ 𝑓𝑓 × 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 
Here N stands for the severity of the consequence, and f for likelihood or expected frequency. In the 
example of Figure 6, n=2.86. If factors between categories are identical on both axes, then a border like this 
(two cells down, one cell to the right) would correspond to n=2. A neutral attitude to hazard aversion (no 
aversion) is expressed by n=1 (which would mean diagonal borders while factors between categories are 
identical on both axes). This exponent n can be compared with criteria applied to the societal or group risk 
in quantified risk assessment: Dutch and Danish criteria (for, among others, major hazard industries) apply 
n=2 (Jonkman, Van Gelder et al., 2003), although it should be noted that the latter value applies to the 
criterion for the cumulative frequency distribution (F) of the adverse events. 
Risk analysts using a risk matrix must be aware of the implicit major hazard aversion and the implication for 
prioritization of resources. While it is justifiable to favor protection against serious accidents, it may also be 
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problematic to spend all resources on highly unlikely events while offering limited protection against less 
severe, if more likely, events.  
6 Uncertainty: continuous probability consequence diagrams as an 
alternative to risk matrices 
Risk matrices use discrete consequence and likelihood categories, and, as a consequence, discrete risk 
levels. As mentioned in section 2, the uncertainty of the assessments is often used as the justification for 
not using point values, but, instead to assign consequence and likelihood to discrete categories covering a 
range of values. However, category assignment does not necessarily represent uncertainty: by assigning an 
event to a category, the analyst actually states that the attribute will exceed neither the upper nor the 
lower limit of the category. If the attributes are close to the central value of the category, large degree of 
uncertainty is accounted for, but when the attribute is close to the category limit, the represented 
uncertainty (in the direction of the limit) may be very small. Furthermore, the maximum uncertainty is 
restricted to the width of the category. 
Uncertainty can be dealt with by using fuzzy sets. Rather than assigning an event to a single likelihood and 
consequence categories, membership functions are used to “distribute” the event over adjacent categories. 
The event then covers several risk cells, and via a reverse fuzzy process a single risk indicator can be 
derived. Markowski  and Mannan (2008)  describe such a technique, where input on a continuous 
(quantified) scale can be transferred to a fuzzy risk matrix, but, unfortunately, the paper does not 
conclusively demonstrate how different levels of uncertainty in the input affect the process. Note that the 
uncertainty that can be expressed in the “fuzzy risk” will be lost in the reverse fuzzy process; the risk matrix 
cannot express uncertainty otherwise than by the width of its categories, as described in the previous 
paragraph. 
An alternative to using discrete “cells” in a matrix would be to use continuous scales for consequence and 
likelihood, thereby producing a continuous probability consequence diagram. A prerequisite for using a 
continuous scale is, of course, that consequence and probability can be expressed along ordinal scales, see 
section 2. Uncertainty can be included by boxes or bands, as shown in the example in Figure 8. Another 
advantage of the continuous probability consequence diagram is that resolution becomes better: it is 
possible to discriminate between hazards that, in a risk matrix, would be assigned to the same cell.  
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Figure 8 Example of a continuous probability consequence diagram, boxes indicate the uncertainty of hazard outcomes in both 
consequence and expected frequency 
 
Probability consequence diagrams in general are described by (Ale, Burnap et al., 2015), who address 
diagrams displaying individual events depicted by pairs of frequency and consequence, and diagrams 
displaying the cumulative distribution of frequency versus consequence. In this paper we limit ourselves to 
the former, as it is analogue to the risk matrix.  
The continuous probability consequence diagram can resolve some, though not all, issues related to risk 
matrices: 
• Consistency with quantitative risk definitions: as the scales are continuous and quantified, independent 
risk definitions based on the measures used along the consequence and likelihood ordinates can be 
plotted exactly in the continuous probability consequence diagram; 
• Resolution; 
• Expressing uncertainty by using uncertainty bands; 
• Explicit visualization of major hazard aversion: any deviation between risk acceptance curves and lines 
of equal expected loss are readily observable (as e.g. in Figure 8). 
 
The continuous probability consequence diagram cannot resolve the issues related to: 
• Subjective assignment of likelihood and consequence; 
• Aggregation and dealing with studies at different levels of detail (although the need to use a 
quantitative consequence scale allows to transfer the results to a cumulative distribution);  
• Consequence ambiguity (other than by considering uncertainty). 
 
Moreover, the continuous probability consequence diagram will lead to new challenges: 
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• Assessing uncertainty in assigned likelihood and consequence if one wants to express uncertainty; 
• The need to define a homogeneous measure for consequence that can be used over the entire range of 
consequence outcomes, e.g. a measure that captures minor injuries as well as multiple fatalities. 
7 Conclusions and recommendations 
The conclusions by Cox (2008) and Flage and Røed (2012) asserting that risk matrices suffer from serious 
disadvantages, are supported by this review. When stakeholders agree on quantified measures and 
assessments of risk, quantified risk assessment is preferred over the application of risk matrices, because it 
leads to fewer methodological uncertainties and less ambiguity in the results. However, risk matrices are 
extensively applied and attempting to curtail their use will be futile. Moreover, it provides support in cases 
where explicit quantification cannot be agreed upon. Therefore, it is considered more productive to 
highlight some of the difficulties with the application of this apparently simple method, and to make users, 
designers and decision makers aware of these difficulties. 
The review and assessments in this paper have engendered a number of recommendations for using and 
designing risk matrices. Most of the assessments support the recommendations presented by the 
informative description of the risk matrix method by ISO (2010). These recommendations will, however, 
not be fully repeated here. Nonetheless, the study gave rise to some additional issues, for which guidance 
is provided. 
This paper takes the position that the coloring of the risk matrix provides a definition of risk in its own right. 
Any comparison with other quantitative risk measures like, for instance, expected loss, serves only to 
understand the (subjective or objective) attitudes to risk that are expressed by the matrix’ coloring. This 
approach removes some of the arguments against risk matrices as expressed by Cox (2008). The coloring 
shall define risk as a monotonously increasing function of consequence and likelihood.  Of the axioms 
defined by Cox only the requirement of betweenness need to be fulfilled by the coloring of the matrix.  
“Coloring” with a limited number of discriminating scores (colors) is sufficient if the purpose of the risk 
matrix is to address risk acceptance. Only when further prioritizing of risks is required, more detailed scores 
can be used. Numerical (ordinal) scores shall not be in conflict with the colors applied in the risk matrix.  
It should always be pursued that qualitative assessments are as objective as possible and are based on 
quantitative assessment or statistical evidence to the largest possible extent. Users shall be supported in 
their assessments by adding quantitative or semi-quantitative guidance (ranges and anchor points) to the 
definition of categories. Some subjective bias can be counteracted by defining the range of likelihood and 
consequence categories extending beyond the range to be expected in the study, i.e. extending the ranges 
slightly beyond what is recommended by ISO. Whenever possible, users should be trained and receive feed-
back on their assessments, especially when they are often involved in risk assessment activities. 
It is advantageous to use (basically) logarithmic scaling of both consequence and likelihood categories. This 
enables the covering of several orders of magnitude of likelihood and consequence, which is often 
demanded for safety studies addressing e.g. both minor injury and multiple fatalities. The use of the same 
scaling (linear or logarithmic) for both dimensions in a risk matrix is recommended. In that case, the usual 
diagonal, stepwise borderlines between risk levels (colors) approximate levels of equal expected loss. This 
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correspondence between diagonal borders in the risk matrix and expected loss is only valid if the factor of 
increase between subsequent categories for both dimensions (consequence and likelihood) is the same (on 
average over the range of categories). Without this occurring, the diagonal borders will implicitly (and 
perhaps unwittingly) express major hazard aversion (or the opposite, major hazard appreciation). 
When using (basically) logarithmic scaling, risk scores are appropriately defined by adding the ordinal 
numbers of the consequence and likelihood category. 
Risk aggregation is problematical with risk matrices, and, consequently, the level of detail in a study may 
affect the representation in the risk matrix, with the more detailed study leading to lower risk ranking. 
Because of this, it is not recommended to split-up or detail out basically similar events with identical 
consequences.  As an alternative, it is possible to define rules for moving the aggregated likelihood of 
several single events with similar outcomes (consequences) to the next likelihood category. 
When applying (and designing) risk matrices, one should bear in mind whether the consequence category 
assigned to an event expresses the potential; the representative or most likely consequence; or a 
distribution of the possible outcomes. Different choices may lead to quite different representations in the 
risk matrix, and, accordingly, to different risk acceptance decisions. 
There are several arguments against the implementation of standardized corporate risk matrices, i.e. risk 
matrices where the coloring is decided centrally and has to be applied on all activities within the company. 
The simplicity of the tool does not justify the tool’s ubiquitous acceptance as the corporate risk acceptance 
standard. The variability of the outcome of risk matrices depends too much on methodology, as described 
in the two points above, and the acceptance of certain risks depends on the size of the operation and may 
also differ for specific ones. 
The continuous probability consequence diagram with its use of continuous scales instead of discrete 
categories is proposed as an alternative to the risk matrix, providing solutions to some problems of the risk 
matrix, i.e. resolution, proper handling of uncertainty and better comparison with objective risk definitions 
such as expected loss.
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